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COMMENTS
Abolishing the Withdrawal of Recognition Doctrine: Serious
Doubts About the Good Faith Doubt Test
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the withdrawal of recognition doctrine, established by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board), an employer with doubts as to the
majority status of an incumbent union can withdraw recognition and refuse to
bargain further. The facts of Peoples Gas Systems, Inc.' provide an example of
the problems created by this doctrine. In 1966, through the election process, the
Board certified a union to be the bargaining representative of the employees of
a utility company. Company management and the union successfully negotiated
two three-year contracts. In 1973, however, negotiations for the third contract
"did not go well."' After approximately three months of negotiations, the
company became suspicious about thestrength of the union based on behavior
of the union leaders during negotiations, including offering to sign any contract
the employer proposed. The company investigated and. found a large decline in
dues check-offs and high turnover among the union members. The employer
filed an RM petition4 requesting an election to determine the status of the union.
At the same time, the employer also notified the union that it would not sign any
contract and would not bargain further with the union. The union filed an unfair
labor practice charge' alleging the employer unlawfully refused to bargain under
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act).6 An
election on the employer's RM petition was never held.7 For seven years, the
question of whether the employer had sufficient objective considerations to doubt
Copyright 1995, by LouiSIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id. at 39.
4. An RM petition is an employer-filed petition for election. An employer petition to contest
the majority status of an incumbent union must be supported by objective considerations sufficient
to support a reasonable doubt as to a union's majority status. Jeffrey A. Norris & Michael J.
Shershin, Jr., How to Take a Case Before the NLRB 98 (6th ed. 1992).
5. Any person including an employee, an employer, or a labor organization may file an unfair
labor practice charge. The charge must contain allegations of a statutory violation under the National
Labor Relations Act. The charge sets investigatory procedures of the Board in motion. Norris &
Shershin, supra note 4, at 314-20.
6. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) refers to the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act of 1935 as amended by the National Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
of 1947 as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). See infra note 65 for the language of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
7. Peoples Gas Sys.. Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the majority status of the union was litigated. While the charge was being
litigated, the union itself requested a representation election and, ironically, lost
by a .decisive margin. Although this is an extreme case, it does demonstrate the
Board's perpetuation ofta Board-created device that is rife with confusion and
inconsistency-allowing withdrawal of recognition as a method of testing a
union's majority status.
For over forty years, the National Labor Relations Board has applied the
same test to determine whether an employer may withdraw recognition from and
refuse to bargain with an incumbent union without being found liable for an
unfair labor practice In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court articulated the test as follows:
Upon certification by the NLRB as the exclusive bargaining agent for
a unit of employees, a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of
majority support for one year .... After the first year, the presumption
continues but is rebuttable. Under the Board's longstanding approach,
an employer may rebut that presumption by showing that, at the time
of the refusal to bargain, either (1) the union did not in fact enjoy
majority support, or (2) the employer had a "good faith" doubt, founded
on a sufficient objective basis, of the union's majority support.9
Although the test as articulated is two-pronged, Board decisions and case law
have only developed the "good faith doubt" test." The deceptively easy good
faith doubt test has proven to be very difficult to satisfy. The Board itself has stated
the burden on an employer is a "heavy one."". This position comports with the
policy considerations of industrial stability and employee free choice which are
primary affections of Sections 1 and 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 12
8. Celanese Corp. of Am.. 95 N.L.R.B. 664.673 (1951), overruled by Hawaii Meat Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 966 (1962) ("[T]he [rlespondent was free to decline to bargain with the Union if its doubt
as to the Union's majority was raised in good faith."); E.A. Lab., Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 625, 683 (1948),
modified, 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[A) refusal to bargain based on the respondent's good faith
doubt ... would constitute a complete defense.").
9. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 777-78, 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1544-45
(1990) (citations omitted).
10. This author found no case or Board decision analyzing a withdrawal of recognition case
using the in fact portion of the test.
11. NLRB v. Phoenix Pipe & Tube. L.P., 302 N.L.R.B. 122, 127, enforced, 955 F.2d 852 (3d
Cir. 1991).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). Section.1 of the NLRA provides:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and
by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 7 of the NLRA provides in part:
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Many have suggested, and recent Board decisions also indicate, that the burden on
an employer is now so heavy that the good faith doubt test has really collapsed into
the second portion of the test-loss of majority in fact."3 Other problems related
to the applicable burden of proof and the types of evidence necessary to satisfy the
good faith doubt test have exacerbated the confusion. Compounding these
problems are significant disadvantages faced by employees, unions, and employers
as a result of the withdrawal of recognition doctrine.
Therefore, based on the same policy reasons the Board has used to justify the
good faith doubt test (namely industrial stability and employee free choice), the
Board should consider changing its position on Withdrawal of recognition. To help
understand the withdrawal of recognition doctrine, this comment will provide
background information on union certification and decertification processes. It will
also develop the legislative and decisional history of the good faith doubt test.
Next, support for the proposition that the good faith doubt test as applied is actually
an in fact test will be developed. Additionally, this comment will discuss the
inconsistencies and the problems that have plagued the good faith doubt test.
Finally, this comment will suggest that the solution goes beyond recognizing the
collapse of the good faith doubt test. Ultimately, the Board should abolish the
withdrawal of recognition doctrine and limit employers to challenging majority
status of incumbent unions by means of RM petitions and elections.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNION AND EMPLOYER
A union can begin a relationship with employees and their employer through
the election process.' A union, an individual employee, or even an employer
can petition to the regional director, who is appointed by the General Counsel for
the NLRB, ns for a representation election. This petition is a formal request to
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
13. Guerdon Indus., 218 N.L.R.B. 658 (1975) (dissenting opinion) (burden on an employer is
so heavy that he has to affirmatively prove loss of majority status); see also, Joseph R. Weeks, The
Union's Mid-Contract Loss of Majority Support: A Wavering Presumption. 20 Wake Forest L. Rev.
883, 889 (1984); Joel B. Toomey. Application of the Good-Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of
Continuing Majority Status, 1981 Duke L.J. 718. 723 (1981).
14. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988). An employer may also recognize a union
voluntarily after a union claims the majority support of employees in a bargaining unit. Additionally,
the Board may impose bargaining orders if it has determined that a meaningful election is impossible.
Norris & Shershin, supra note 4, at 55-62.15. For administrative purposes, the United States is divided into 33 regions. The representa-
tive of the Board, the General Counsel, appoints and supervises the regional director. Norris &
Shershin, supra note 4, at 39.
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determine if a majority of employees wish to be represented by a particular
union.' 6 A union can file a petition if the employer has not recognized it as the
bargaining representative.' 7 The union may even file a petition if the employer
has recognized it as the bargaining representative but the union wishes to obtain
the benefits of certification. 8 The union's petition must demonstrate that thirty
percent of the employees support a representation election.' 9 An individual
employee by signed petition, also, must show at least thirty percent of the
employees in a potential bargaining unit support a representation election.2" An
employer may file a petition (referred to as an RM petition) when no union is
recognized as the bargaining representative and one or more unions claim status
as the bargaining representative.2' Upon Board approval, employees vote in an
election. The union wins an election with a favorable vote of over fifty percent
of valid votes cast in the election." If the union receives the necessary votes,
the Board issues a certificate of representation designating the union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.23
The end of the bargaining relationship is more uncertain. The bargaining
relationship may end through an employee-filed decertification petition, an
employer-filed RM petition, or unilateral withdrawal of recognition by an
employer. An individual employee may file a decertification petition with a
showing that at least thirty percent of the employees in a bargaining unit want
an election to determine the status of their bargaining representative. 4 Before
an employer can file an RM petition with the regional director requesting an
election to determine the status of an incumbent union, the employer must show
16. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1988).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(A)(i) (1988).
18. McGraw-Edison Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1972). Benefits of certification include, but are
not limited to, an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year, an obligation of the
employer to bargain with the union for one year after certification absent unusual circumstances, and
dismissal of any petition for election absent unusual circumstances. Norris & Shershin, supra note
4, at 62.
19. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a)(4) (1994); Norris & Shershin, supra
note 4, at 96-103.
20. NLRB Rules and Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a)(4) (1994); Norris & Shershin, supra
note 4. at 96-103.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(B) (1988); NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.17
(1994); see also United States Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 502 (1981); Norris & Shershin, supra note
4, at 68.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994) ("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining .... "); R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936); Lemco Constr.. Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 459
(1987); Norris & Shershin, supra note 4, at 238-39.
23. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(b) (1994); 2 NLRB Casehandling Manual
ii 11470, 11472.1-11472.3 (1989); Norris & Shershin, supra note 4, at 270-73.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(A)(ii) (1994); NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18
(1994); 2 NLRB Casehandling Manual, supra note 23. If[ 11020-11034; Norris & Shershin. supra
note 4, at 96-98.
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objective considerations demonstrating reasonable grounds to doubt. the union's
majority status.' Additionally, an employer may simply refuse to bargain with
a union and withdraw recognition.' This refusal is likely to result in the filing
of an unfair labor practice charge. The employer can successfully defend against
the unfair labor practice charge by establishing it had a good faith doubt or in
fact proof based on objective considerations of the union's lack of majority
status." The standard used to test employer-filed petitions and withdrawal of
recognition by the employer is the same-sufficient objective considerations."
Instead of encouraging the use of the more certain election process, the policies
of the National Labor Relations Board have encouraged the use of the Board-
created doctrine of unilateral withdrawal of recognition by an employer.
Ill. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress passed the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 193529 to
provide a means to resolve labor disputes and to provide employees with the
rights to organize, bargain collectively and engage in strikes.3" Under the
Wagner Act, the NLRB did not allow employees to petition to decertify an
incumbent union," and the power of labor organizations grew.32 In 1947,
Congress passed the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act33 to
provide a check on the growth of unions and to provide a balance of power
between the unions and the rights of employers and employees.34 Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress specifically gave employees the right to petition for
a decertification election to determine the status of a collective bargaining
representative." s Congress, under the Taft-Hartley Act, also gave employers the
right to petition for a representation election when presented with a request for
25. 2 NLRB Casehandling Manual, supra note 23. ]T 11042-11042.9; United States Gypsum
Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966).
26. During the first year after certification, the majority status of a union cannot be challenged.
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778; 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1544-45 (1990).
27. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
28. See United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.LR.B. 652, 656 (1966); Curtin Matheson Scientific,
Inc., 494 U.S. at 755, 110 S. Ct. at 1542. See also Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB:
Employer Challenges to an Incumbent Union, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 653, 690 (1991).
29. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1988). See supra note 12 for text of these sections of the Act.
31. Tabardrey Mfg. Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 246 (1943).
32. Patrick Hardin, The Developing Labor Law 35-36 (1992).
33. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167,
171-187 (1988)).
34. See Hardin, supra note 32, at 39-40. See also Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1988)).
35. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167,
171-181 (1988)). Under the Taft-Hartley Act, Section 9(c)(I)(A)(ii) was amended to recognize the
right of employees to petition for decertification elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1988).
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recognition by "one or more individuals or labor organizations." '36 Although the
language of the statute is unclear, the legislative history of the Act demonstrates
the amendment was also intended to allow employers to challenge incumbent
unions by employer-filed petitions for elections." In fact, the debate on the
provision focused on employer-filed petitions in the incumbent union context.38
Moreover, Board decisions after the Taft-Hartley Ac t interpreted the amendment
as applying to employer-filed petitions in both the initial recognition context and
the incumbent union context. 9
The Chairman of the NLRB at the time, Paul M. Herzog, clearly opposed
employee petitions for decertification elections.40  The Chairman saw the
employee petitions for decertification elections as an unnecessary replacement for
the withdrawal of recognition doctrine.4  He testified that if there were
sufficient defections from a union, an employer would refuse to bargain until a
new election was held. 2 He admitted that this was a "roundabout" way of
handling the problem but did not believe that employee petitions for elections
offered a better solution. 3 Chairman Herzog was concerned that employee
petitions would upset the stability of incumbent unions, that "dissident groups"
36. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(B) (1988). "Although, before the amendment of the Act, an
employer was able to invoke the representation procedures of the Board only when confronted by
conflicting claims to representation, Section 9(c)(l)(1)), now enables an employer to file a
representation petition when a single representative requests recognition." United States Gypsum Co.,
90 N.L.R.B. 964, 966 n.4 (1950).
37. See Flynn, supra note 28, at 691-92 for a detailed discussion of the legislative history of
Section 9(c)(I)(B) of the Act.
38. Those opposing the amendment stated:
Section 9(c)(I)(B) would provide, however, that an employer could also file a petition
whenever one labor organization presented a claim to be recognized. The most serious
objection to the proposed amendment is that in situations where unions are established in
a plant and only questions of continuing majority are involved, the Board would not
clearly have discretion to dismiss the petition if there was no reasonable basis in fact for
the employer to doubt that the labor organization still represents a majority .... Unless
the Board has sttch discretion, employers seeking to avoid collective bargaining acquire
a useful device for delay by filing petitions .... Uninterrupted and stable bargaining
relationships would thus be impaired.
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess.. pt. 2, at 11 (1947).
39. "Although, before the amendment of the Act. an employer was able to invoke the
representation procedures of the Board only when confronted by conflicting claims to representation,
Section 9(c)(I)(B), now enables an employer to file a representation petition when a single
representative requests recognition." United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 966 n.4 (1950).
40. Labor Relations Program. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on S.55 and SJ. Res. 22 and all other Bills and Resolutions Referred to the Committee
Having the Object of Reducing Industrial Strije in the United States, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1917-18
(1947) (statement of Paul M. Herzog. Chairman, NLRB) [hereniafter Hearings].
41. The test used then was similar to the one used today. An employer's good faith doubt as
to a union's majority status was a complete defense to the reftisal to bargain. E.A. Lab. Inc., 80
N.L.R.B. 625, 683 (1948), modified, 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1951).
42. Hearings, supra note 40, at 1917-18.
43. Id. at 1917.
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would have complete freedom to challenge the union at any time, and that
employers would be induced to stir up anti-union activity. 44 The Chairman also
opposed employer petitions in the incumbent union context because an employer
with a good faith doubt could simply refuse to bargain. Since the Chairman,
speaking for the NLRB, believed employee and employer petitions were an
unnecessary replacement for the withdrawal of recognition doctrine, the Board
continued to use the doctrine, applying the good faith doubt test as the standard
for withdrawal of recognition even after the Act became law.45
IV. DECISIONAL HISTORY
The earliest Board decisions used a good faith doubt test very similar to the
one used today.46 If an employer refused to bargain based on a good faith
doubt as to a union's majority status, this good faith doubt, even if wrong,
constituted a complete defense to an unfair labor practice charge alleging the
employer's refusal to bargain.4 7  However, after the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Board seemed to accept that decertificAtion elections and RM
petitions48 replaced unilateral withdrawal of recognition by employers. In
United States Gypsum Co.,49 decided in 1950, two years after the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, the Board stated that under the Act, employees could change
their bargaining representative "through Board processes by means of a rival-
union or decertification petition."" Concerning an employer's challenge to a
bargaining representative's majority status, the Board stated:
44. Id. at 1917*-18.
45. We thus conclude that in the instant case, as the Union's certificate was more than
a year old at the time of the alleged refusal to bargain, the [employer) was free to decline
to bargain with the Union if its doubt as to the Union's majority was raised in good faith.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951), o'errided by Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
966 (1962).
46. An individual, an employer, or a union may file an unfair labor practice charge with the
regional office. If an investigation shows the charge is meritorious and attempts to informally resolve
the dispute are unsuccessful, the regional director, on behalf of the General Counsel (who represents
the Board), starts formal proceedings. An administrative law judge oversees a formal hearing and
prepares a decision. Iflexceptions are filed to the decision, the Board reviews the written record and
issues its own decision and order. If the decision and order are not complied with voluntarily, the
Board may petition to have its orders enforced by the appropriate United States Court of Appeals.
An "aggrieved" party may also seek review by the appropriate court of appeals. The United States
Supreme Court has final review. Norris & Shershin. sqira note 4. at 314-16. 379-80, 401-04. 431-
33. 438-39, 457-61, 464.
47. E. A. Lab., Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 625, 683 (1948), modified, 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[A]
refusal to bargain based on the respondents's good faith doubt as to the Union's majority would
constitute a complete defense.").
48. See supra note 4 for the definition of RM petition.
49. 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950).
50. Id. at 966.
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The Act also provides the method whereby an employer who, in good
faith, doubts the continuing status of his employees' bargaining
representative may resolve such doubt by filing an employer peti-
tion.... Once employees have designated their bargaining representa-
tive in accordance with the Act, recognition of that representative is not
a matter which an employer may or may not grant when and as he
chooses. A duty to bargain with such a duly designated representative
has been imposed upon him by the Act. The Act also provides the
methods whereby such duty may be dissolvedst
The Board also specifically rejected a pre-Act decision relied on by the employer
as authority for allowing an employer to challenge a union based on a good faith
doubt.5 2
Seven months after Gypsum, however, the Board returned to the good faith
doubt test in its pre-Act form as a complete defense to an employer's refusal to
bargain. In Celanese Corp. of America.53 the Board, giving no reasons,
resurrected the approach of challenging majority status through withdrawal of
recognition resulting in subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings.5,4
In a 1959 decision, the Board applied a slightly different form of the good
faith doubt test. In Stoner Rubber Co.,3" the Board used a two-step approach.
First, the employer had to "produce sufficient evidence to cast serious doubt on
the union's continued majority status."m By doing so, the employer rebutted
the presumption of majority status, and the General Counsel"7 was required to
"come forward with evidence that ... the union in fact did represent a majority
of employees in the appropriate unit."sS The Board provided interesting policy
reasons to support this approach. It stated that a secret election was "the most
satisfactory way" to prove a union's majority status.59 Additionally, the Board
stated that "[piroof of majority is peculiarly within the special competence of the
51. Id.
52. In support of its contention that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority, and
had a right, therefore, to insist on a Board election, the Respondent in its brief cites Sport
Specialty Shoemakers... in which the Board found that aunion's majority status... was
subject to challenge .... That arose, however prior to the amendments to the Act, when
... the.employer could not file a petition.
Id. at 966 n.5 (citing Sports Specialty Shoemakers, 77 N.L.R.B. 1011 (19513).
53. 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), overruled by Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 966 (1962).
54. Id. at 673. The Chairman of the NLRB at the time of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,
Paul M. Herzog, clearly preferred withdrawal of recognition over elections. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-41.
55. 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
56. Id. at 1445.
57. The General Counsel represents the Board which issues a complaint usually against an
employer in response to an unfair labor practice charge filed by a charging party, usually the union.
Norris & Shershin. supra note 4, at 35-37.
58. Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959).
59. Id. at 1444.
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union. '60 Nevertheless, in 1973, the Board expressly repudiated the Stoner
approach.6' Since that time, the Board has used a test nearly identical to the
one used over forty years ago in Celanese.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION DOCTRINE
For one year after certification of a collective bargaining representative, the
majority status of a union is irrebuttable.6" After that year, the presumption of
majority status becomes rebuttable.6 3 An employer can lawfully withdraw
recognition from an incumbent union after the certification bar is removed ifthe
employer proves that on the date recognition was withdrawn, the union in fact
lacked majority status or that the employer had a good faith doubt as to the
union's majority status.6' If an employer unlawfully withdraws recognition, it
commits an unfair labor practice under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. Under Section 8(a)(1), an employer cannot coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights. 6 Under Section 8(a)(5), an employer
cannot refuse to bargain with its employees' representative.66
The good faith doubt test, a seemingly simple test, becomes more complex
when one considers" how an employer must prove a good faith doubt.67 The
Board and the courts use a case-by-case analysis which changes with the views
of the Board and courts. 6 The employer's doubt must be based on objective
considerations. 69 The Board's inconsistent analysis of these objective consider-
ations makes the employer's task of gathering evidence difficult. More
60. Id. at 1445.
61. Automated Business Sys.. 205 N.L.R.B. 532, 534 (1973), entf denied, 497 F.2d 262 (6th
Cir. 1974) (A good faith doubt is a complete defense to refusal to bargain.).
62. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
63. Id.
64. Id.; Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987).
65. Section 8 of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their] rights .... " 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1988).
66. Section 8 of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice fur an employer ... to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1988).
67. Although the term "good faith doubt" suggests an analysis of the subjective intent of the
employer, the Board has ruled that motivation of the employer is irrelevant. Good-faith-reasonable
doubt is probably a more appropriate term since the Board considers objective considerations.
Toomey, supra note 13, at 721 n.19.
68. "The problem with this case-by-case approach is that both the employer and the Union are
subject to the shifting views of the members of the Board and the courts as to what evidence is
sufficiently 'objective' and convincing to demonstrate a good faith doubt." Peoples Gas Sys., Inc.
v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
69. Bryan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 484 U.S. 849, 108
S. Ct. 147 (1987). See also Douglas E. Ray, Withdrawal of Recognition frons ai, hIcumbent Union
Under the National Labor Relations Act: An Appraisal, 28 Vill. L. Rev. 869, 886-908 (1983); see
also infra text accompanying notes 104-129.
1995]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
importantly, the Board's inconsistent analysis inhibits the employer's ability to
predict whether the evidence it has gathered will be determined by the Board to
be sufficient to support a good faith doubt. In addition, the employer must prove
a good faith doubt by a preponderance of the evidence.70 However, the Board
requires the employer to meet this burden with "clear, cogent, and convincing"
evidence." The result is a burden that, in practice, is much higher than a
preponderance of the evidence.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. How Heavy Is the Burden?
1. Phoenix Pipe & Tube 2
The Board and the courts have recognized that the burden on the employer
is a "heavy one."03 In fact, even individual Board members have found the
burden is so heavy that it requires the employer to affirmatively prove loss of
majority status. 4 The Board, however, has maintained that the two parts of the
test, the good faith doubt portion and the in fact portion, are distinguishable. 3
The argument that the good faith doubt test has collapsed into the in fact portion
of the test has become stronger in light of the recent decision of Phoenix Pipe
& Tube.' 6
In Phoenix Pipe & Tube, the employer based its good faith doubt on
statements made by employees and'a petition for an election signed by a majority
of the employees." Initially, the Board stated an employer could prove a good
faith doubt with less than proof that an actual majority had rejected union
representation. 7' However, this statement directly conflicted with the Board's
ultimate holding. The Board held the employer did not establish a good faith
doubt because the employer did not have statements from a numerical majority
70. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1211 (1992).
71. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
921, 99 S. Ct. 2847 (1979).
72. 302 N.L.R.B. 122, enforced, 955 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 127.
74. Guerdon Indus., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 664 (1975) (dissenting opinion) ("The resort to
sophistry, it seems to me, is merely an implementation of the impossible burden placed on an
employer to prove a negative, that is, the union does not represent a majority of the unit
employees.").
75. Sofco, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 159, 160 (1983) ("[Wle note that a respondent does not bear the
burden of proving that an actual numerical majority opposes the union."); see also Destileria
Serralles, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 51, 51 (1988), enforced. 882 F.2d 19 (ist Cir. 1989).
76. 302 N.L.R.B. 122, enforced. 955 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1991).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 127 ("While it appears that an employer may rebut this presumption of majority status
with less than actual proof that a majority have rejected union representation, the Board notes that
in view of the policies underlying the presumption, 'the employer's burden is a heavy one."').
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of the employees clearly repudiating the union.79 In a footnote, one of the three
Board members withdrew from the position that proof of majority is required.
He stated that he did not rely solely on the lack of majority in making his
decision.80 Interestingly, in upholding the order of the Board, the Court of
Appeals relied on the Board's statement that its decision was based solely on
lack of a numerical majority of the employees clearly repudiating the union.8'
Although infrequently cited by subsequent decisions, when cited, Phoenix
Pipe & Tube creates controversy. One such decision is Albany Steel, Inc.,82 in
which the administrative law judge interpreted Phoenix Pipe & Tube to require
proof of numerical majority to support a good faith doubt. The judge stated:
In rejecting the employer's claimed good-faith doubt in Phoenix Pipe
& Tube, the Board majority made it clear that it was relying solely on
the employer's failure to prove that a mathematical majority of unit
employees had repudiated ("clearly repudiated") the Union as their
representative.
... Phoenix Pipe & Tube states the law: a failure to prove a
repudiation by a mathematical majority rebuts an employer's claim of
a good-faith doubt that a unit majority supports the union .... 8'
The Board, in a very short opinion, upheld the judge's finding but expressly
stated it did so without relying on his interpretation of Phoenix Pipe & Tube.8
4
A similar exchange between the Board and an administrative law judge
occurred in The Kobacker Co."5 The Board upheld the administrative law
judge's decision without relying on his statement that "the evidence presented
must unequivocally indicate that a union's support has declined to a minority. "8
Nevertheless, two 1993 decisions, one Board decision and one administrative law
judge decision, cite Phoenix Pipe & Tube for the proposition that a majority of
the membership of the union must clearly repudiate the union for an employer
to have support for a good faith doubt.8 7
79. Id. at 122 ("IWle rely solely on the fact that, assuming arguendo, the statements of 24
employees to various of the Respondent's managers were a clear repudiation of the Union, this does
not constitute a majority of the unit.").
80. Id. at 122 n.2.
81. N.L.R.B. v. Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P., 955 F.2d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Board
concluded that because the statements were not received from a majority of the 54 unit employees
when PP & T rejected the Union's recognition request, this evidence did not provide objective
support for a good faith belief that the Union did not enjoy majority support.").
82. 309 N.L.R.B. 442 (1992), enf. cond. granted by 17 F.3d 564 (2d Cir.), dec. supp. by 314
N.L.R.B. 1096 (1994).
83. Id. at 455.
84. Id.
85. 308 N.L.R.B. 84 (1992).
86. Id. at 84 n.I.
87. R.P.C. Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 232, 241 (1993) ("until the majority of the membership clearly,
objectively, and unequivocally demonstrate they no longer desire to be represented in a collective
19951
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Even before Phoenix Pipe & Tube, when the Board did not directly state an
employer had to establish a numerical majority to have repudiated the union, its
analysis often focused on a numerical majority. For example, in Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.," the Board found an employer's good faith doubt unsubstantiated
because only 217 of 509 employees repudiated the union. In reaching this
decision, the Board relied on two other decisions that found lack of support for
a good faith doubt because the employer did not demonstrate loss of support by
repudiation by a numerical majority of the union members.8 9
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the decision.90 The court found
the Board did not accord sufficient weight to other factors such as violence
during the striking and the filing of a decertification petition. 9' The court
implied it disagreed with the Board's use of the withdrawal of recognition
doctrine to test the status of an incumbent union.92 The court stated:
In effect, an election which would have determined quickly and
decisively the Union's actual majority status or lack thereof has been
delayed almost nine years in order for an AU, the NLRB, and now this
court to deliberate as to whether the Union enjoyed such status, and if
so, whether [the employer] had reason to doubt it.9'
2. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.
In another recent decision,94 the Board purportedly laid to rest confusion
about the burden of proof applicable to establishing a good faith doubt. The Board
held "in order to rebut the presumption of an incumbent union's majority status, an
employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence either actual loss of
majority support or objective factors sufficient to support a reasonable good-faith
doubt of the union's majority."9 In Laidlaw, the Board upheld the administrative
law judge's finding of insufficient evidence to support a good faith doubt. The
Board, however, did so without relying on the decisions the judge cited using
bargaining relationship by that specific union entity"); Rock-Tenn Co., 1993 NLRB LEXIS 507 at
!19 (May 25, 1993), ajfd as nodified, 315 N.L.R.B. 670 (1994) ("The evidence relied uponby the
employer must show that a majority of unit employees have actually repudiated the union.").
88. 289 N.L.R.B. 358 (1988). enf denied, 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 362 n.15 (citing Cain's Generator & Armature Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1198 (1978),
enforced, 628 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980) (9 of 23 statements insufficient)); Dy-Dee Wash, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1977) (only 3 of 7 unit employees expressed dissatisfaction with the union).
90. 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
91. Id.
92. id. at 1431.
93. Id. at 1431 n.7. The election in this case was a decertification election based on an
employee petition, not an employer RM petition. The court's statement does, however, demonstrate
a preference for the election process.
94. 307 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1992).
95. Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
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"clear, cogent, and convincing" as the appropriate burden of proof." Since this
decision, Laidlaw has been cited mechanically for the appropriate burden of
proof-by a preponderance of the evidence.97
The Board, however, stated "clear, cogent, and convincing" may still be
significant in withdrawal of recognition cases. 98 The Board then referred to NLRB
v. Tahoe Nugget as one decision proposing that this phrase should apply to the type
of evidence an employer can use to meet the ultimate burden of proof, which is by
a preponderance of the evidence. 99 At least one Board member, in a footnote to
the Laidlaw decision, expressly endorsed this approach.'0 ° He clearly believed
"clear, cogent, and convincing" should apply to the type of evidence an employer
can rely on and "by a preponderance of the evidence" should apply to how much
of such evidence an employer must produce.'0 ' The Board in its decision stopped
just short of supporting this approach, stating evidence clearly has to be more than
"speculative, conjectural, and vague" which is the opposite of "clear, cogent and
convincing."' 02 However, the Board did not clearly adopt the "clear, cogent, and
convincing" standard for the type of evidence an employer must introduce.
The Board's failure to articulate the difference between the burden of proof for
withdrawal and the type of the evidence required to satisfy withdrawal only
exacerbates an already confusing situation. In Phoenix Pipe & Tube, the Board
required the employer to prove loss of a numerical majority but was allegedly
applying a good faith doubt test.' 3 In Laidlaw, the Board stated an employer
only has to meet its burden of proving a good faith doubt by a preponderance of the
evidence.'O° Nevertheless, citing supporting Board decisions, at least one court
has stated that an employer must meet its burden with a type of evidence that is
"clear, cogent, and convincing."'0' These confusing positions of the Board seem
impossible to reconcile.
96. Id. at 1211. Hutchison-Hayes Int'l, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1982): Westbrook Bowl, 293
N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1989): Bolton-Emerson. Inc.. 293 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 n.2 (1989), enforced,
899 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1990).
97. The Kobacker Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 84 (1992); Spillman Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 95, 97 (1993).
enforced, 41 F.3d 1507 (6th Cir. 1994); Pollock Mfg., Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 562, 562 n.2 (1993); Rock-
Tenn Co., 1993 NLRB LEXIS 507 (May 25, 1993), aff'd as modified, 315 N.L.R.B. 670 (1994).
98. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1992).
99. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921,
99 S. Ci. 2847 (1979). In discussing its use of the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard the court
stated "as applied to the reasonable doubt defense, this criterion is primarily directed to the type of
evidence relied upon; the standard of proof is unchanged, to wit: whether there is sufficient reliable
evidence to cast serious doubt on the union's majority." Id. at 297 n.13 (citations omitted).
100. Laidlaw, 307 N.L.R.B. at 1212 n.9 (Member Raudabaugh).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1212.
103. 302 N.L.R.B. 122, 122 (1991). For a discussion of Phoenix Pipe & Tube, see supra text
accompanying notes 72-81,
104. Laidlaw, 307 N.L.R.B. at 1211.
105. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 442 U.S.
921, 99 S. Ct. 2847 (1979). See supra note 99 for the court's discussion.
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VII. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE GOOD FAITH DOUBT TEST
A. Objective Evidence
The Board requires an employer to support a good faith doubt with objective
evidence which is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.'06 Inconsistent analysis
of the type of evidence suitable to be objective has led to confusion. An
employer faces at least two obstacles in reaching its goal of sufficient objective
evidence. The first obstacle is gathering the evidence. The second obstacle is
passing the scrutiny of the Board.
An employer has limited ways of gathering evidence.0'0 The methods
used by an employer cannot be coercive and cannot violate any employee rights
under the Act.'08  An employer has little or no access to union records.'
In most situations, any employer involvement can make the evidence invalid
because of policy concerns of employer coercion and evidentiary reliability.
Employees must usually spontaneously provide the information."'
An analysis of the requirements for polling of employees demonstrates the
difficulties employers face when gathering evidence to support a good faith
doubt. Policy concerns subject polling to strict procedural guidelines."' The
Board adopted guidelines designed to discourage employers from intimidating
employees." 2 These guidelines ensure that employees' rights under Section
106. "For many years, the Board has judged the legality of an employer's withdrawal of
recognition from an incumbent Union by making a case-by-case determination whether the
employer's asserted doubt as to the Union's majority status is in good faith and is supported by
substantial objective evidence." Peoples Gas Sys., Inc.. 629 F.2d 35, 43 (1980) (footnote omitted).
107. See Tahoe Nugget. 584 F.2d at 301 ("The employers argue that placing on them the burden
of refuting the presumption of majority status is unfair because the Union has superior access to the
information regarding Union support. The effect, respondents conclude, is that they are forced to
assume the risk of erroneous determinations. We agree: the employer usually does have inferior
access to the relevant information and may risk further penalty in garnering additional data. Yet we
think the burden is fair.") (footnotes omitted).
108. Struksnes Constr., Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 (1967). See infra note I10 for policy
considerations and guidelines on polling of employees.
109. Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959) ("Proof of majority is peculiarly within
the special competence of the union.... An employer can hardly prove that a union no longer
represents a majority since he does not have access to the union's membership lists and direct
interrogation of employees would probably be unlawful as well as of dubious validity.").
110. Struksnes, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1062 ("In our view any attempt by an employer to ascertain
employee views and sympathies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the
mind of the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, therefore, tends to impinge on his
Section 7 rights.").
11. Id. at 1063.
112. Id. The Board articulated the procedures and policy considerations as follows:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1)
the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority. (2) this
purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4)
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7 of the Act governing free choice are not violated." 3 The Board and the
courts disagree on the burden an employer has to meet before he can conduct a
poll. The Board's policy is that an employer must have a reasonable doubt as
to the union's majority status before it can poll."' Moreover, the Board has
interpreted this reasonable doubt test for polling to be the same test as that used
for withdrawal of recognition."3 Therefore, an employer can only poll when
it does not need to poll. In other words, if an employer has sufficient evidence
to support polling, it has sufficient evidence to support lawful achievement of its
ultimate goal-withdrawal of recognition." 6
At least two circuit courts disagree with using the same standard for
withdrawal and polling. The Fifth ' 7 and Sixth" Circuits believe the burden
should be lighter for polling than for withdrawal of recognition. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., noted that he has
doubts whether the Board can insist "that good-faith doubt be determined only
on the basis of sentiments of individual employees, and at the same time bar the
the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair
labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
... The requirement that the lawful purpose be communicated to the employees, along
with assurances against reprisal, is designed to allay any fear of discrimination ....
Secrecy of the ballot will give further assurance that reprisals cannot be taken against
employees because the views of each individual will not be known. And the absence of
employer unfair labor practices or other conduct creating a coercive atmosphere will serve
as a further warranty to the employees that the poll does not have some unlawful object,
contrary to the lawful purpose stated by the employer. In accord with presumptive rules
applied by the Board with court approval in other situations, this rule is designed to
effectuate the purposes of the Act by maintaining a reasonable balance between the
protection of employee rights and legitimate interests of employers.
Id at 1063 (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 1062.
114. Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974).
115. Id. See also Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1991)
("The NLRB's position about the amount of evidence needed to poll is the same as its position on
withdrawal of recognition.").
116. The Board takes the position that an employer must set forth objective evidence
establishing that over 50% of the affected employees have rejected the incumbent union
as their representative before the employer may take a poll. This is the same showing
required by the Board before an employer may lawftlly refuse to bargain with a certified
union. We find the Board's position to be untenable. Under the Board's analysis, an
employer would only be allowed to take a poll tnder circumstances where no poll was
necessary; the only value of the poll would be to double-check the employer's already
sufficient evidence to refuse to bargain.
Thomas Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 687 F.2d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 1982).
117. Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 398 ("The NLRB's position about the amount of
evidence needed to poll is the same as its position on withdrawal of recognition. This circuit,
however, feels that there is a lesser burden for an employer to justify holding a poll.") (citation
omitted).
118. Thomnas Indus., 687 F.2d at 867. See supra note 113 for the court's discussion.
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employer from using what might be the only effective means of determining
those sentiments."'"19
Allowing employers to poll more freely is not the answer to the problem of
gathering evidence.' The policy reasons behind the strict guidelines' for
employer polling are important. This discussion merely demonstrates that an
employer is the party in the weakest position to determine the true status of
union representation. As the Board itself noted in Stoner, "proof of majority
support is peculiarly within the special competence of the union."'22
An employer's second obstacle is passing the scrutiny of the Board. One
court has commented that the case-by-case approach used in evaluating objective
evidence leaves the union and employers "subject to the shifting views of the
members of the Board and the courts as to what evidence is sufficiently
'objective' and convincing to demonstrate a good faith doubt."'23  This court
also noted that minor factual differences are often the deciding factors.' 2 A
brief review of some of the evidence an employer can rely on to support a good
faith doubt demonstrates the Board's inconsistent approach.
An employer can only rely on employee statements which unequivocally
repudiate the union. In Phoenix Pipe & Tube, the Board described the law on
employee statements as follows:
It is not sufficient that an employee says he does not need union
representation. It is not sufficient that an employee be critical of his
representation. It is not sufficient to say that he does not care if he is
represented or not. It 'is not sufficient that the employee says he is
content without union representation.' 25
Additionally, all of the following types of evidence standing alone are
usually insufficient to support a good faith doubt and are often given little
probative weight: high employee turnover, low union membership, union
admissions of lack of membership, union inactivity, poor strike support, and
proof that an employee decertification petition has been filed.' 26
119. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775. 797. 110 S. Ct. 1542. 1555 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
120. For a detailed discussion of polling as related to withdrawal of recognition see Flynn, supra
note 28, at 664-77.
121. See supra note 112 for policy reasons.
122. Stoner Rubber Co.. 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
123. Peoples Gas Sys., Inc., 629 F.2d 35. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
124. Id. at 43 n.14 ("A standard under which such small factual differences are decisive seems
questionable when an ultimate finding of an unfair labor practice and a resultant bargaining order
have such important consequences for the employees' section 7 rights.") (Comparing Peoples Gas
with Viking Lithographers, Inc.. 184 N.L.R.B. 139 (1970)).
125. NLRB v. Phoenix Pipe & Tube, 302 N.L.R.B. 122, 128, enforced, 955 F.2d 552 (3d Cir.
1991).
126. See Ray, supra note 69, at 886-908; see Toomey. supra note 13, at 734.
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Additionally, the Board has adopted presumptions that often weaken the
significance of many of these evidentiary categories. For example, the Board
has held withdrawal from union membership does not constitute lack of union
support,' and new employees are presumed to support the union in the same
numbers as the workers they replace.' 28 Furthermore, the Board has refused
to adopt a presumption concerning strike replacements. 2 9  The Board has
refused to presume replacements do not support the union even though the
interests of the replacements are in conflict with the interests of the strikers.'
30
The Board has reasoned that replacements may be working for financial reasons.
Additionally, the conflicting interests of replacements and strikers may be
resolved after the strike. Justice Scalia criticized this-approach as "counterfact-
ual.' 3'
B. Disadvantages to Employers, Unions, and Employees
The inconsistent and unpredictable approach of the Board creates significant
disadvantages for all parties involved. An employer, more than likely, is fighting
a losing battle. While the test on its face seems easy to meet, some have
suggested it is one employers cannot possibly meet. 32 First, an employer is
required to prove the negative-that the union did not have majority support.' 33
Additionally, in trying to gather objective evidence, an employer risks commit-
ting an unfair labor practice. Employers who question employees about union
sentiments may run afoul of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which prohibits an
employer from coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the
Act." For example, an employer cannot conduct a poll of his employees
without following strict guidelines.' 3 If the employer does not follow these
guidelines, it commits an unfair labor practice.'
Additionally, an employer may face financial penalties if it unlawfully
withdraws recognition. If an employer makes unilateral changes in wages or
other mandatory bargaining areas while withdrawal is being challenged, it may
be penalized if the Board later finds recognition was unlawfully withdrawn.'
127. Servomation, Inc., 235 N.L.RB. 975. 978 (1978).
128. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc.. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921, 99
S. Ct. 2847 (1979); Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enf denied on other
grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966).
129. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientilic. Inc.. 494 U.S. 775, 110 S. Ct 1542 (1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1565 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Guerdon Indus., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 664 (1975); see also Flynn, supro note 28, at 678.80;
Ray, supra nole 69, at 875, 910; Toomey, suipra note 13, at 723.
133. Guerdon, 218 N.L.R.B. at 664. See supra note 74 for the Board's discussion.
134. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967).
135. Id. See also supra note 112.
136. Struksnies, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063.
137. Fibreboard Paper Prods., Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 85 S. C1. 398 (1964); Taurus Waste
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Also, if an employer changes employee benefits without bargaining first, it can
be ordered to restore any changed benefits.'
There can be a significant -time delay involved in litigating withdrawal of
recognition challenges especially when a decision of the Board is challenged in
the courts.13 9 This delay has negative implications for the union. The union,
during the pendency of an unfair labor practice charge, loses the ability to
represent its members because of the employer's refusal to bargain with it. If
a union does in fact have majority support when recognition is withdrawn, this
support may erode after months or years of non-recognition. Union members
may become frustrated with the union's inability to do anything while the unfair
labor practice charges are pending.t4 Additionally, unions run the risk that
employees hired while the charges are pending will not support them with the
same vigor as those who have had the benefit of continuing union representa,
tion."
These same time delays also have a negative impact on employees. During
this tire, employees are denied their lawful right to representation in collective
bargaining. Employees are also denied any favorable terms and conditions of
employment their union may have obtained through bargaining during the period
of delay.
An important goal of the Act is employee free choice.'42 However, the
present inconsistent approach often leaves the employer and the union "in the
dark" as to the true choice of the employees." 3 If the union actually does have
the majority support of the emp!oyees, allowing an employer to unilaterally
decide not to bargain based on an as-yet-unproven good faith doubt, clearly
frustrates the Act's policy of free choice. Conversely, if the union actually has
lost majority support, the employees' wishes eventually may be frustrated, and
the employer may pay for trying to effectuate their wishes simply because the
Board is not satisfied with the way the employer has articulated its reasons.'
Additionally, under the Board's "blocking charge" doctrine, serious unfair labor
Disposal, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 309 (1982).
138. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S. Ct. 1107 (1962). Section 8 of the Act imposes a duty
to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). See supra note 66 for the language of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
139. See e.g., Peoples Gas Sys.. Inc., 629 F.2d 35 (1980) (seven-year delay); NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990) (eleven-year delay).
140. See Douglas E. Ray, Withdraval of Recognition after Curtin Matheson: A House Built
Upon Sand, 25 U.S.F. L. Rev. 265 (1991).
141. Id.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). See supra note 12 for the language of Section 7 of the Act.
143. ITIhe present procedures and standards ... leave both the Company and the Union
in the dark as to when a challenge can be made, often require years to resolve, and run
a substantial risk of frustrating actual employee wishes simply because the Board is not
satisfied with the Company's ability to identify and articulate the reasons for its doubt
about the Union's support.
Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 44.
144. Id. at 44.
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practice charges have to be resolved before an election can be held. "" This
doctrine prevents employees who truly oppose their current representative from
selecting another representative or decertifying their current one when their
employer has been charged with unlawful, unilateral withdrawal of recogni-
tion.'1 6  Employees are the true victims in this Board perpetuated struggle
between employers and unions.
VIII. PROPOSALS
The good faith doubt test is unworkable. Commentators have suggested
several different solutions ranging from re-working the good faith doubt test to
making employer-petitioned elections more accessible.'47 The Board itself has
stated that it prefers the election process to the withdrawal of recognition
doctrine.'48 The time has come for the Board to change its approach.
A. Rethinking the Good Faith Doubt Test
1. Adjust the Good Faith Doubt Test
At least one commentator has suggested the Board should make the good
faith doubt test more predictable by being consistent in its rulings on objective
considerations. " ' This solution, however, would not be a lasting one. The
present test and its application have evolved over a forty-year time span. The
method the Board uses is entrenched in its decisions. As long as the Board uses
a case-by-case approach, the changing composition of the Board members will
affect its decisions.150 Without safeguards in place, such as established criteria
for what constitutes a good faith doubt, nothing will prevent the Board from
gravitating toward confusion and inconsistency again.
Moreover, problems caused by the present application of the good faith
doubt test would not be solved. Time delays between withdrawal by an
employer and a decision by the Board would still keep employees from enjoying
the benefits of their lawful collective bargaining rights for extended periods of
time. The employer, the party in the weakest position to establish lack of
majority status, would still be the party responsible for gathering the objective
145. * The blocking charge doctrine prevents an election when tinfair labor practice charges are
pending. Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974). See Flynn, supra note 28, at 699-704.
146. Johns-Manvillc Sales Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 358. enf denied, 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
147. William A. Krupman et al., Withdrawal of Recognition Based on Objective Consider-
ations-Reckoning by Starlight, I Del. J. Corp. L. 288, 301 (1976); Toomey, supra note 13, at 742;
Ray, supra note 69, at 908-922; Flynn, supra 'note 28, at 663-64, 677-99.
148. Texas Petrochemicals, Corp.. 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989), reoaided as modified by Texas
Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
149. See Knpman. supra note 147, at 301.
150. See supra note 143 for one cotn's discussion of this issue.
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evidence. The concerns inherent in requiring the employer to gather evidence,
namely coercion and evidentiary reliability, would still exist.
2. Return to the Two-Step Approach
Another commentator has suggested returning to the two-step approach of
Stoner.' Under this approach, an employer who proved a good faith doubt
at a minimal standard would rebut the union's presumption of majority status.
The union would then have the burden of proving its majority status.
This proposition solves the problem of having the party in the weakest
position trying to prove majority status. The ultimate burden would be on the
party best suited to determine majority status, the union. 5 2 Additionally, one
commentator has suggested this approach minimizes the threat to industrial
stability because unions with true majority status could easily prove their
support.' However, this approach does not solve the problem of delay.
Litigating even the lower standard required by Stoner to establish a good faith
doubt could involve significant time delays.154 Also, the Board takes the
position that a lower standard may invite employer coercion and repeated
attempts to frustrate union stability.'
3. Recognize the Collapse of the Good Faith Doubt Test
Presently, the Board mechanically articulates a two-pronged test with a good
faith doubt portion and an in fact portion. Employers rarely, if ever, rely on the
in fact portion of the test." 6 Employers naturally choose the good faith doubt
test because they believe it is easier to meet.' In any event, the good faith
doubt test, as applied by the Board, requires proof of in fact loss of majority.
As a possible solution, the Board could recognize this collapse and apply a
one-part in fact test. Employers would then know actual loss of majority support
must be proven to support withdrawal of recognition. This proposal, however,
does not solve the problem of delay. Moreover, the employer, the party in the
weakest position to gather objective evidence, would still bear the burden of
proving majority status.
Two additional major flaws are inherent in all three of these proposals. Unions
must initially prove majority status through elections to be recognized as the
151. See Toomey, supra note 13, at 742.
152. Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
153. See Krupman. supra note 147, at 733.
154. Ray, supra note 69, at 912. See infra note 180 for a discussion of the time delays
associated with filing an unfair labor practice charge.
155. Texas Petrochemicals, Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1062 (1989), remanded as nmodified by
Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
156. This author found no decisions applying the in fact portion of the test.
157. See Flynn, supra note 28, at 680.
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collective bargaining representative of the employees."' To even have an initial
representation election, an individual employee wishing such an election to certify
a bargaining representative must show support from at least thirty percent of the
employees." 9 To win an election, employees must agree by a majority vote to
representation. 160 Similarly, to conduct a decertification election, at least thirty
percent of the employees in a bargaining unit must support the petition161 and.
must vote by a majority to decertify the union. 16' Employers should not be
allowed to bring this bargaining relationship to a halt with unilateral withdrawal
when the bargaining unit of employees, the party represented by the union, cannot
even call an election without a showing of thirty percent support from their fellow
employees. Additionally, under the withdrawal of recognition doctrine, an
employer relies wholly on circumstantial evidence. This Board-created doctrine
does not provide the reliability or the direct evidence that an election provides.
A second major flaw is that none of these solutions addresses what should be
the ultimate issue-the true majority status of the union. As long as the test is
called the "good faith doubt" test, the Board's focus will not be on whether the
union actually lacked majority support, but on whether the employer believed the
union lacked majority support. It is time for the Board to change its focus. The
Board should consider not only abolishing the good faith doubt test, but also the
entire withdrawal of recognition doctrine.
B. Abolishing the Withdrawal of Recognition Doctrine
Can the Board abolish the withdrawal of recognition doctrine? At least one
commentator at the time of the Taft-Hartley Act predicted that withdrawal of
recognition would not survive the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act that was
passed in 1947.16' For a brief period, even the Board seemed to accept that
158. Section 9 of the Act provides: "Whenever a petition shall have been filed, ... [the Board]
shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(l)(A) (1988).
159. Section 9 of the Act provides:
Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centurn or more of the employees in a
bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor organization
... the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the
results thereof to such labor organization and to the employcr.
29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1988).
160. Section 9 of the Act provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of.all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining .... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). Norris & Shershin. supre note 4, at 238-39.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18
(1994); 2 NLRB Casehandling Manual, supra note 23, V 11020-11034; Norris & Shershin, supra
note 4, at 96-103.
162. See supra note 160 for the language of Section 9(a) of the Act.
163. See Ray, supra note 140. at 270 n. 39; Flynn, supra note 28, at 683 n.198 (citing The New
Labor Law 49-50 (1947)).
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withdrawal did not survive the passage of the Act.'6 In fact, nothing in the
Act requires the Board to maintain this standard. More than one commentator
has determined that this standard is not legislatively mandated.' 65 Even Justice
Blackmun, in his dissent in Curtin Matheson, suggested the Board could abolish
the good faith doubt portion of the standard. He stated the Supreme Court "has
never held that the Board is required by statute to recognize the good faith doubt
defense, and the Board's power to eliminate that defense remains an open
question."'"
In Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB,.67 the Supreme Court
considered demands for recognition by a labor organization in the initial
representation context. The Court held elections provided the best way to
determine majority status.1' The method used to begin a relationship between
union and employer is equally appropriate as a method to end the relationship.
The Court held an employer could reject a demand for recognition and wait until
majority status was proven by an election. t69 The Court noted the time delay
associated with unfair labor practice proceedings was far greater than that for
decisions made by the regional director on the filing of petitions for elec-
tions.10 The Court stated "the policy of encouraging secret elections under the
Act is favored.''. For these same reasons, the Board should consider
abolishing the withdrawal of recognition doctrine in the incumbent union context
and consider adopting more inviting election policies.'7
164. United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950). See supra text accompanying notes
46-54.
165.. Ray. supra note 140, at 272; Flynn, supra note 28, at 687-88.
166. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 800, 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1556
(1990).
167. 419 U.S. 301, 95 S. Ct. 429 (1974).
168. Id. at 306-07, 95 S. Ct. at 432.
169. In sum, we sustain the Board in holding that, unless an employer has engaged in an
unfair labor practice that impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization cards
purporting to represent a majority of the employees, which is refused recognition, has the
burden of taking the next step in invoking the Board's election procedure.
Id. at 310, 95 S. Ct. at 434 (footnote omitted).
170. The union which is faced with an unwilling employer has two alternative remedies
under the Board's decision in the instant cases. It can file for an election; or it can press
unfair labor practice charges against the employer .... The latter alternative promises
to consume much time. In Linden. the time between filing the charge and the Board's
ruling was about 4 1/2 years; in Wilder, about 6 1/2 years. The Board's experience
indicates that the median time in a contested case is 388 days. On the other hand the
median time between the filing of the petition for an election and the decision of the
Regional Director is about 45 days.
Id. at 306, 95 S. Ct. at 432 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
171. Id.
172. At least one commentator has suggested prohibiting withdrawals of recognition. Flynn,
supra note 28, at 677-89.
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C. Elections
Under current Board policy, an employer has to meet the same standard for
an election to be held based on an RM petition as it does for withdrawal of
recognition-a good faith or reasonable doubt based on sufficient objective
considerations.'73 As a result of the heavy burden associated with withdrawal
of recognition, an employer can only petition for an election when it no longer
needs one. If enough evidence is gathered to support a good faith doubt under
present Board policy, actual loss of majority status has already been proven. An
employer, therefore, has no need to file a petition and wait for an election.
Furthermore, because of the Board's "blocking charge" doctrine, petitions rarely
result in elections. 74 Typically, an employer files an RM petition and refuses
to bargain while the regional director evaluates the petition. Then, the union
alleges the employer violated its duty to bargain in good faith. This charge by
the union "blocks" the election. The Board has maintained that this good faith
doubt standard for RM petitions is legislatively mandated.' During the
development of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board itself suggested that good faith
doubt be the standard for employer petitions. However, Congress actually
rejected this approach. 17 6
For the RM petition to be a successful solution, the current policy needs
adjustment. The standard for RM petitions should be lowered. The Board must
do away with the absurdity of an employer proving a union has lost majority
status before it can hold an election to determine majority status.' An
employer should only have to meet a "true" good faith doubt test to file an RM
petition. One commentator has suggested that the Board could use the same
standard used for employee petitions. If an employer has evidence that at least
thirty percent of the employees have expressly repudiated the union, the
employer should be able to obtain an election.'" To solve the "blocking
charge" doctrine problem, the Board could require the employer to continue to
bargain until the outcome of the election.
The Board should also develop guidelines for what constitutes a good faith
doubt instead of evaluating this evidence strictly on a case-by-case basis.t 9
173. Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974).
174. See supra note 145 for a discussion of the "blocking charge" doctrine.
175. Texas Petrochemicals Corp.. 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1059, 1061 (1989), remandedas niodified
by Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB. 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States Gypsum
Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966)). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of RM
petitions, see Flynn, supra note 28, at 690-96.
176. Flynn, supra note 28, at 690-93.
177. Id. at 690.
178. Id.
179. The Board has power to do this under its rule making powers granted by the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 156 (1988). Section 6 of the Act provides the Board may "make, amend, and rescind, in
the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the Act's provisions." Id. The Supreme Court has recognized the Board's
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Specific guidelines would prevent time delays and repeated, unfounded petitions
filed by employers in bad faith. Additionally, the delays for request for elections
by employers to the regional director are far shorter than the delays for decisions
on an alleged unlawful withdrawal of recognition charge. °80 Most importantly,
this approach would focus on the ultimate issue, true majority status, not on
whether the employer believes the union has majority status.
IX. CONCLUSION
Two main objectives of the National Labor Relations Act are employee free
choice and industrial stability.'" The withdrawal of recognition doctrine
frustrates these two objectives. The doctrine promotes protracted battles before
the Board and courts and often prevents an efficient determination of the true
wishes of employees. The decisionil history demonstrates the problems inherent
in the doctrine, including inconsistency in the evaluation of objective evidence,
confusion over the burden of proof, and disadvantages to employers and
employees. The ultimate solution to these problems lies not in merely adjusting
the withdrawal of recognition doctrine, but in abolishing it.
Elections provide a superior method of determining a union's majority status.
The lcgislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that Congress intended
the election process and not the withdrawal of recognition doctrine to be the
primary means of beginning and ending a collective bargaining relationship.,'8
Because employees and a union usually begin their bargaining relationship by
election, an employer should not be able to disturb this relationship with less
than an election. In addition, petitions for elections are procedurally faster than
a determination of whether recognition was lawfully withdrawn. As the Board
itself has recognized, employee rights are best protected by the election process,
and protection of employee rights was the reason for the initial enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act.'
Maria Fabre Manuel
limited power of nle making under Section 6 of the Act. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S.
606, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
180. 57 NLRB Ann. Rep. 179 (1992). In 1992. the median number of days from the filing of
an unfair labor practice charge to an administrative law judge decision was 216 days and from the
filing of an unfair .labor practice charge to a Board decision was 509. The median number of days
from filing an election petition and a regional director's decision was 44 days and from filing an
election petition and a Board decision was 272 days.
181. See supra note 12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1988).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
183. Texas Petrochemicals, Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989). remanded as modified by Texas
Petrochemicals, Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991); Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B.
1440 (1959).
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